11 AUG 1978

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MEMORANDUM FOR:

Naval Operations Branch,
Soviet Strategic Forces Division, OSR

FROM: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Article by Captain Bowling, "The Negative
               Influence of Mahan on Anti-Submarine Warfare,"
               RUSI JOURNAL, December 1977

    Attached is an interesting article I came across the other
day which relates to our study of the SLOC situation. I thought
the historical part of it was very interesting. On the bottom of
page 5, the author makes the assumption that the Soviets have
learned these lessons of history. He doesn't have much to
substantiate that other than the size and shape of the fleet,
however.

STANSFIELD TURNER

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11 AUG 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Administration

FROM: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Compartmentation

1.   Further to the conversation you, ⌷ and I had   25X1
on security and compartmentation, I have just reviewed a memo of
last September from Marv Gentile just before he left the Security
Committee ("Community Security Needs and Problems," 29 September
1977, SECOM-D-282). In it he had the following paragraph:

> "The Intelligence Community's special security control
> systems are conspicuous for their lack of central management
> and common standards. The perception of abuse in this area
> (whether or not well founded) has prompted pleas for change
> from many Community agencies. But, we are just now beginning
> to take tentative steps towards some sort of standardized
> procedures. A basic problem is that there are too many
> Community components involved in the subject. Another funda-
> mental problem, and the one that may well cause the most
> suspicion on the part of consumers, is that the collectors who
> argue the need for compartments to begin with are also the
> ones who write the implementation rules, with their programs
> and procedures subject effectually only to review by themselves.
> Current approaches to the subject favor those with a vested
> interest in the status quo. Arguments are often made for the   25X1
> continuation of a system not so much because it is currently jus-
> tified, but because of history. ⌷   25X1

Executive Order on security classification provides, for the first
time, national level standards for compartments, and requires
that all existing ones be measured against those standards and
continued only where they are satisfied. Under those standards,

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the DCI must personally approve all compartments in writing.
I believe he must be able to look to a single Community
focal point to coordinate the varying inputs he will need
to judge the appropriateness of a compartment. Collectors
obviously need to be able to argue their case for protection.
Consumers need to be able to argue their case on utility of
data. Someone needs to assess proposed systems and advise
whether the desired security objectives can reasonably be
satisfied in the real world. Then, there needs to be a
Community focal point to manage the approved compartments by
keeping track of authorized accesses and fielding complaints
and suggestions about programs."

2. If I understand it, the Security Committee is now working on
implementing directives for the new security order which will move
in the directions Marv was talking about here. Essentially, I hope
that I will confirm or cancel existing compartmentation, possibly
setting up new compartments and establishing rules to ensure that I'm
kept posted of bigot lists, etc., that are created outside the
compartmentation area. Is that correct, and are we going to take care
of these points that Marv raised?

STANSFIELD TURNER

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cc: Deputy Director for
     Resource Management